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"'THE BRIGHTEST ERA THE CONFEDERACY HAD EVER KNOWN':
TEXAS PRESS OPINION OF THE FALL OF ATLANTA AND THE
REELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN"
By Ben Melvin Hobratsch

Historian Charles W. Ramsdell in 1924 first argued that a general decline
in public morale doomed the Confederacy. Since that time, hlstorians have
supported his thesis and tied the ebb in morale to a lack of governmentsponsored propaganda. More recently, historians have shifted the blame to
Confederate newspapers that were too critical of government and unable to
rally the citizenry behind "the cause." Scholars claim that in the wake of
military and political failures newspapers showed a tendency to find fault
rather than to look at events from a positive angle. Yet, although the study of
Confederate press opinion has attracted well-deserved scholarly attention, its
study has been almost invariably linked to the news press of eastern states;
Texas press opinion has received only scant consideration by scholars. I
One aspect of the Texas press that has benefited from meticulous study is
the period of time from the establishment of the first Texas newspaper amid
the turmoil of the War of 1812 to the divisive months leading to the secession
convention in Fehruary 1861. However, scholarship considering the Texas
press during the Civil War has mentioned it in incidental ways. Wartime Texas
press opinion of key military and political events and the effects of their
coverage on the morale of the readership have not been as carefully
investigated. It is the intention of this author to begin such an investigation by
examining Texas press coverage of the Union capture of Atlanta and the
reelection of Abraham Lincoln. 2
Texas press coverage of the fall of Atlanta and the reelection of President
Abraham Lincoln provide propitious subjects for study for two reasons. First,
these two events significantly affected the fortunes of the southern bid for
independence. Atlanta was a key rail and telegraphic depot that served as the
hub between the eastern and the western states of the Confederacy. Lincoln's
reelection was important for southerners because it hushed speculation that the
northern electorate had grown weary enough of the war to demand peace.
Additionally, both of these events occurred concomitant to one another in the
latter half of 1864, more than a year after the fall of Vicksburg, the point
generally conceded to be the beginning of the decline in Confederate morale.
Thus, a study of Texas press opinion during this period provides a unique
opportunity to administer a test on the effects of distant military and political
events upon the press opinion and morale of a state on the periphery of the
nation. The uniqueness of Texas's wartime newspaper culture within the
broader context of Confederate newspaper culture will be examined. If the
case of Texas is found to be s.iml1ar to that of eastern states, news coverage and
morale should exhibit signs of despondency; however, if unique, Texas
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newspapers should exhibit a level of morale divergent from the currently
accepted norm.-1
By examining the extant Civil War-em Texas newspapers - both rural and
urban dailies and weeklies - pubhshcu in the ~ummcr, fall. and winter of L864
as well as the pertinent sCl:ondary literature, the reader develops a sense of
Texas press opinion of the fall of Atlanta and Lincoln's reelection. Sometimes
the information provided in the accounts. turned out to be false; however, the
sentiment was always valid..)
Texas pres~ opinion and the opinion of the Texas public were inextricably
linked. Newspapers were the primary medium by which Texans received news
of the events going on in the East. Letters from the front were not so frequent,
and published journals were often of a literary or cultural nature. In addition
newspapers were inexpensive, and one copy was often shared among several
readers.~

Many Texans believed what they read. Given the void of any other
information about the war, the contents and opinions expressed by the news
press had a direct elIect upon popular opinion. As a result, the best way to see
inside the mindset of the Texan is to read what he read - the newspaper. h
In months directly preceding Atlanta's capture, the Confederate war effort
enjoyed a generally high level of public supp011. General Robert E. Lee was
successful in encumbering the Federal drive toward Richmond. Northern
forces suffered staggering losses at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania. and Cold
Harbor. Because of comparisons made by Texas newspapers between Grant's
losses at Cold Harbor and Sherman's losses at Kennesaw Mountain, Texans
were confident of the situation in Georgia as \\icll. Texas newspapers found
that the Confederate army under Joseph E. Johnston generally prevailed in its
attempts to protect that city from Sherman's army. Although Johnston allowed
a steady advance of Sherman's troops. editors pointed out key victories in
which the casualty trade-off was decidedly in the favor of Confederate forces.
Throughout the campaign. his ability to maintain a low rate of casualties
contributed to the press's favorable opinion of Johnston. Sympathetic press
and public opinion seemingly vindicated his "defensive" attack strategy.'
In mid-July, President Jefferson Davis removed Johnston from his
command and replaced him with John Bell Hood. a Texan. The Davis
administration wa~ frustrated with Johnston for "always" retreating and not
pursuing a more aggressive strategy. Once Johnston was replaced by Hood, the
Texas press demonstrated loyalty to Richmond by abandoning their original
stance and asserting that Johnston's defensive strategy was incompatihle with
an ultimately successful defense of Atlanta. Texas editors expounded that
despite their deep affection for the general. Johnston's successive retreats gave
too much valuable ground to Sherman's army. The press was especially wary
of Johnston's movement from his propitious position at Kennesaw Mountain
to one south of the Chattahoochee River within a few miles of the city. It
became increasingly evident to the War Department and to the Galveston NeH'S
alike thal it was prohahle that in search of beller ground on which to fight,
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Johnston would give up Atlanta to Shennan without a contest.
Editors also cautioned their readership. Although Hood was a "gallant
officer [who was] not afraid to risk his reputation in a battle," the decision to
replace Johnston with Hood may have been made too late to save Atlanta. Too
much ground had already been lost when Hood took command near the
outskirts of the city. Additionally. the troops were exceedingly fond of
Johnston and familiar with the peculiarities of his generalship. They were wary
of Hood. Johnston was weH-loved by his troops for the very reasons that the
Davis administration and later the Texas press forsook him - he was overly
cautious and unlikely to lead bloody charges at strong enemy positions. By
contrast, no one questioned Hood's bravery; he had lost a leg and bad a dead
arm from previous engagements. R
Nevertheless, those who had access to Texas papers read of the constancy
of Hood's troops and their unwillingness to allow Sherman entrance into
Atlanta. The Marshall Texas Republican went so far as to state that not only
did the Confederate troops still hold the city, but they were likely to break
Sherman's atcempts at a siege and in turn siege the Federal army. The idea
sounds questionable, but tbe notion that Sherman's army could survive and
excel as deep into Georgia as it presently was conJlicted with Texans' notions
of both Hood's "rare pluck" as a general and that of their own southern
exceptionalism.~

News coverage also highlighted the numerous failed attempts of
Sherman's troops to push the Confederates from their positions. In stark
contrast to newspaper editors' previous warnings of a probable breakdown of
Confederate lines at Atlanta, evidence of battlefield failures are conspicuously
absent from the columns of Texas newspapers. In the one instance that a
telegraphic report mentions Confederate troops being driven from their
position. it is pointed out that the position was immediately retaken. 1O

By late August, Hood's troops were rapidly becoming encircled and
besieged around Atlanta. All the same, papers continued to provide their
readership with examples of "great victories" and "splendid successes
achieved" such as the "annihilation of some of (Sherman's] commands." It was
not uncommon to read of a daring Confederate charge over the enemy
breastworks. One late-August morning the San Antonio News reported to its
subscribers that Hood's troops had driven Union forces from their first two
lines of entrenchments. According to war correspondent "Personne,'" these
victories decimated Yankee morale; concomitantly, they served to preserve and
bolster Confederate morale. For "Personne," the ruins of Atlanta were void of
anything material worth retaining. The exigency in mainlaining that city lay in
that "the morale of the army had to be preserved." I I
Texas editors, such as Willard Richardson of the Galveston Neyvs, no
doubt agreed with "Personne." In an effort to bolster civilian morale and shift
the focus of the reader from possibly disheartening news, accounts of
"victories" of an increasingly trivial nature were scattered throughout his
paper. DesulLOry firing was presented in one issue "produdingJ great
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consternation among the enemy." The "victories" presented to the readership
were not always directly combat-related. A small cavalry raid, in another issue,
was lauded for capturing "a large number of beeves."l'

Additionally, as was the case during both Johnston'~ and Hood's tenure in
command of the Army of Tennessee, the Texas press pointed to low casualty
numbers as a reason to remain confident in the progress of the nation's
struggle. Confederate losses in the Atlanta campaign were offered as
infinitesimal in comparison with Yankee losses that were, according to the
Dallas Herald, «incomparatlvely large [sic]." Along similar lines the Crockett
Quid Nunc drew up a table in one is~ue presenting Confederate losses in the
Atlanta campaign as just over 65,000 men, The Quid Nunc contrasted this total
to the large sum of 283,070 men lost by the Federal army in VirRinia.1:

In addition to highlighting the scattered successes of Hood's army, editors
pointed to what they viewed as the moral depravity of Sherman's forces in an
cfTort to unify their readers behind a banner of moral rectitude. Newspapers
informed their readership that Sherman had ordered his artillery to shell
Atlanta. killing women and children, in full knowledge of the fact that Hood's
lines were entrenched outside of the city_ For this act the Dallas Herald
branded Sherman a barbarous murderer. Most likely such announcements,
which were printed alongside those detailing the steadfast heroism of the
Confederate troops, served to create a scene for the reader that confirmed both
the success of the military aspects of the war and the moral righteousness of
the southern cause. The "barbarous murderer" was being convincingly held at
bay by Hood's constant and "virtuous" troops. i.
Nevertheless, on September 1, 1864, Hood withdrew from Atlanta. and
the following morning Shennan's forces occupied the city. In the weeks that
followed, eastern newspapers trickled across the Sabine River and made their
way into editors' hands, By the end of September, news of Atlanta's
capitulation made its way into Texas papers. Not surprisingly. the news was
heralded as a "severe blow" but no cause for alarm. Editors such as Robert W.
Loughery of the Marshall Texas Republican and J.H. and l.R. Burnett of the
Crockett Quid Nunc evinced the belief that the holding of the city of Atlanta
itself gave the Union army no advantage; Sherman could not claim victory,
and Southerners should not abandon hope, unless Hood's anny was squarely
defeated. Meanwhile, Hood's army escaped unscathed and even "repulsed
with slaughter" pursuing Union troopS.I"i
Editors were aware that Atlanta's raJi to Union forces, a catastrophe of the
first magnitude, struck a hard blow to the morale of their readership. The
damage of Atlanta's capitulation was evident in the longer time it took to get
news from Richmond. Predictably, the Texas press 4uickly mobihzed to soften
any possible harm to morale. In their efforts to combat the sudden wave of
despondency, editors sought to bolster the resolve of readers in three key ways.
First, editors ensured their readers of the insignificance of Atlanta's fall. This
was accomplished by presenting the city's capture as an unequivocal good. In
the eyes of the press. Sherman's capture of Atlanta was a "defensive victory"
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for the South that freed Hood's army from a city of ruins that contained
nothing of military value. Any war materiel had been shipped off or destroyed
by Confederate troops before their evacuation. Now mobile, Hood could lure
Shennan deeper into Georgia. 16
Second, as was the practice before Atlanta's capitulation, articles of
various lengths highlighted the perceived moral degeneracy of Sherman's
troops and the depredations they committed upon Atlanta's inhabitants. The La
Grange True Issue informed its readers that Sherman and his officers had
celebrated their victory by attending a ball accompanied by "black harlots." In
the same light, various papers printed accounts of Atlanta evacuees who had
been stripped of everything of value by northern troops. The intent of these
stories was to enrage the heart of any pro-Confederate Texan.]7
The third argument the press employed to maintain higher levels of public
morale was that the morale of Hood's army was high. To this end, newspapers
published official army records that evinced the high level of army morale.
Often these reports were published in the same issue that announced Hood's
withdrawal. Along the same lines as the arguments put forth by editors, the
reports from Hood's army rooted its spirit in the fact that it still constituted an
able and mobile fighting force. Editorial precautions such as this helped
cushion the blow of the recent military failure. IS
This coverage instilled a belief among editors and readers alike that
Sherman would be forced to retreat from Georgia to his base of operations in
Tennessee. Apparently oblivious to the fact that his forces could live off the
land as they marched across Georgia, newspapers infonned Texans that the
Federal anny's supply lines were precariously stretched hundreds of miles
long. This notion that Sherman was committing substantial logistical errors
bolstered the Confederate conviction of long-term success. News articles
alluded to Sherman's apparent inability to move swiftly across the state. In
mid-October the Marshall Texas Republican stated that because of damaged
roads and rail lines. Shennan would be immobilized for a month to conduct
basic repairs. Sherman's immobilized force would then be pinned down by
Hood and Nathan Bedford Forrest. Sherman, squarely defeated, would be
unable to leave Georgia with an organized anny.19
Even when such quixotic predictions became false, editors retained
optimism. As the months roBed on it became evident that Sherman was not
retreating to Tennessee, but alternatively pursuing a march toward Savannah.
The roadblocks that newspapers had stated were detaining Sherman were nonexistent. Damaged roads proved to be of no consequence to northern forces,
and Hood had proven unable to Tout or trap Sherman's army. Nevertheless, as
late as mid-December papers such as the Gonzales Inquirer startlingly opined
that Sherman's campaign in Georgia had produced nothing but failure and
disappointment to the Yankee cause; the Marshall Texas Republican proffered
that autumn as "the brightest era the Confederacy [had] ever known."2o
Aside from the loss of Atlanta, another misfortune befell the Confederacy
in the autumn of 1864 - the reelection of Lincoln to a s.econd term as President

8

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

of the United State~ in November. Lincoln's election in 1860 had proven to be
a catalyst that sparked secession in the South. His reelection marked a clear
determination among the northerners to pursue the war until the southern
rebellion was completely suppressed. Although Lincoln's reelection should
have naturally diminished public spirit, press coverage of the northern
presidential election provides another clear example of the attempts of Texas
newspapers to shape civilian morale.
Beginning in the early summer. the Confederate press exhibited a great
interest in the United States' presidential election, and the Texas press was no
exception to the rule. Editors saw in the 1864 canvass a hope for an early
termination to the war. The fact that the Lincoln administration had been
unable to force the South back into the Union within the confines of his first
term nurtured a notion in the southern mind that northerners were growing
tired of war as well as the idea that Lincoln did not have the ability to win the
conflict. In the southern mind, northern malcontents would naturally support
an opposition party such as the Democrats. Therefore, the aspirations of an
early conclusion to the war rested on the chances of the Democratic Party in
the upcoming election. In light of this, the Democrats' late August convention
at Chicago received ample exposure in Texas papers. Where Lincoln's
National Union (Republican) Party convention at Baltimore received a few
lines of coverage or in many cases no coverage at all, the Democratic
convention received columns. Texas newspapers many times even included
authoritative adumbrations of the convention's resolutions - the most
interesting of which was a call for peace. 11
When the Democratic convention nominated fonner general-in-chief
George B. McClellan for the presidency, E. H. Cushing, editor of the Houston
Telegraph, informed readers that northern support for the peace movement was
strong. According to Cushing, leading Republican journals were urging
Lincoln to withdraw from the presidential race since his defeat by McClellan
was inevitable. Several northern journals and the Texas press alike felt that
Lincoln's chances for reelection were slim. With Grant seemingly stalemated
at Petersburg, the northern war effort suffered from a lack of decisive military
victories from the late spring throughout the summer of 1864. The seemingly
never-ending war took a toll on the appeal of a ticket committed to continue
war to the last extremity.ll
The trend of military stagnation and sanguine southern hopes for an early
peace ended just days after the Democratic convention when two crippling
events occurred. First was news of Sherman's occupation of Atlanta and the
key rail junction the city commanded. This blow to the southern cause renewed
vigor among the previously desiccated Republican Party as well as among the
war Democrats. If the war was going well for the North, the war was going
well for the Lincoln-Johnson ticket. Second and arguably just as shattering to
Texas editors was the substance of McClellan's acceptance letter. In accepting
the Democratic nomination he rejected peace without unification and as a
result rejected the pro-peace platfonn of the convention that had nominated
him for the presidency.2~
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These twin debacles served briefly to dishearten the press. John W.
Swindells of the Dallas Herald confessed his "disappointment on reading
[McClellan's acceptance letter]." A sense of betrayal is even felt in the
editorials concerning the matter. The Jefferson Confederate News presented
McClellan's nomination as the culmination of a grand premeditated ruse by
which the war Democrats tricked the peace Democrats into giving their
support to McClellan only to have him, once accepted by the unified party,
reject the peacc plank of the party platform. 24
Texas editors quickly made the best of bad news. To this end, in the wake
of military failure and McClellan's rejection of the peace platfonn, Texas
editors switched positions on which candidate they preferred to have elected
president of the United States. Some papers announced that the outcome of the
northern election no longer concerned the Confederacy. William H. Neblett of
the Corsicana Navarro Express articulated that his paper did not "care a cent"
who wins. Other papers were not so ambivalent. Reevaluating the possible
benefits of the Lincoln~Johnson ticket and determining that Lincoln's
reelection would provide the best outcome for the Confederacy, many Texas
papers offered various reasons why Lincoln's election - and not McClellan's
- would more likely lead to an acceptable peace. The Houston Telegraph
averred that Lincoln is "half whipped-half badly wounded." Editor Cushing
saw the northern gains at Atlanta not as a major turning point that would
eventually lead to a northern victory, but as an anomaly in a war record that
wa,<;; on balance strewn with failure. Thus, the peace-seeking portion of the
northern electorate would vote for him because they knew he could not
continue the war much longer.
McClellan on the other hand would be a fresh replacement and would
prolong the contlict for a much longer time. Unhke Lincoln, he had not
endured the grinding wartime pressures of the executive office for fOUf years
- he was not near the breaking point. The Dallas Herald and the Confederate
News echoed this estimation when they argued that Lincoln's worn out
administration would be much more likely to propose an acceptable peace.
Any peace offered by a newly elected McClellan administration, on the other
hand, would require reunification and reconstruction and thus would be out of
the question. 25
Additionally, Lincoln's ticket offered another net benefit for southerners
that McClellan's ticket did not provide - Andrew Johnson would hold the vice
presidency. The Dallas Herald ran an editorial that argued that Johnson was so
detested throughout the South that his election would cause a mass
realignment of loyalties in Tennessee. Amhivalent and pro-Union Tennesseans
would flock to the Confederate cause, repulsed by Lincoln's association with
a man repugnant to the virtue of the southern gentleman. While the argument
was exaggerated - the notion that an undecided Tennessean's loyalties could
be uniquely won by the promotion of one man within the Lincoln government
is preposterous - the article highhghtcd the extent to which editors went to
find good in otherwise foreboding events. 26
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Whether editors wi~hed Lincoln's victory in the upcoming election or not,
an almost universal predictl0n pervaded Texas newspapers - Lincoln would
win. Since Sherman's capture of Atlanta, victories in the Shenandoah Valley
and at Mobile Bay had been won by northern forces. In stark contrast to a mere
two months earlier, a continuing string of northern military successes
vindicated Lincoln's war plans. For the northern electorate, the tide had turned
in favor of war and consequently in favor of the Lincoln administration. For
their part, McClellan's ticket offered no competitive advantage for voters.
McClellan's rejection of his party's platfonn had alienated peace-minded
voters; voters of the more belhcose persuasion had already found their leader
in President Lincoln.:'7
When the results finally reached Texas in late-November and earlyDecember, there was no surprise. Newspapers lectured Texans to stiffen their
resolve for a brutal fight. Lincoln's victory in the presidential election was a
declaration for four more years of "uncivilized war" by the northern voting
public, or a.."i the Galveston News put it, "those who've voted to destroy us."
Although newspapers informed their reader~ that Lincoln would prepare for
four more years of war, the Texas press hardly believed the war could last
much longer. As stated previously, editors felt the Lincoln administration's war
effort would soon collapse from fatigue. The call to prepare Texans for a stiff
fight was seen as the call for the coup de grace. That is to say, editors did not
present these misfortunes as anything so serious that they would alter the
eventual outcome of the war. The intention of these admonitions was to
strengthen the doggednes~ and morale of the readership.1H
For those Texans who did feel that the southern cause was now lost, the
Texas press admonished that submission to the North was unthinkable.
Surrender now would be an acknowledgement that aU the suffering and death
that the South had endured had heen in vain. Additionally, submission would
entail the reconstruction of the Union, which was universally denounced
throughout the Texas press. An editorial that was reprinted in newspapers from
the Richmond Examiner presented the alternative to continued watfare as the
acceptance of a dissolute South in which southerners, forced into serfdom,
would be lowered to "beg shelter and employment from Yankee and negro
masters." Rather than face such morally offensive consequences, many
wayward Texans fell back in line to support the cause,29
In contrast to coverage of Atlanta's capitulation to northern forces, once
newspapers announced that Lincoln was victorious, the issue was for the most
part dropped. News of the ongoing struggle between Hood and Shenllan
resonated throughout newspapers for months after Atlanta fell. Papers clung to
hopes that the loss could somehow be reversed in the immediate future - that
Sherman could be routed and Atlanta could be regained. This level of tenacity
was not possible with Lincoln's election because the outcome could not be
undone: it was a fixed truth that Lincoln would be the president of the United
States for four more years. Despite this one instance of contrast between the
press' treatment of Atlanta's capture and Lincoln's reelection, coverage of
these two events proved to be more similar than dissimilar. The reason for the
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striking similarities is that their coverage served the same end - to solidify
support for the national war effort.
The examination of Texas press opinion of both the fall of Atlanta and the
reelection of Lincoln has revealed three trends. The first was a pronounced
degree of uniformity of opinion across all of the newspapers - the Texas press
being consistent in its pro-government stance. Texas was unlike other sections
of the Confederacy, such as Georgia and North Carolina, where opposition
papers such as the Augusta Constitutionalist and the Raleigh Standard were
accepted as a necessary byproduct of a democratic system. The editors of
opposition papers in Texas either "went with their state" after Texas withdrew
from the Union and muted their own criticisms for the sake of patriotism, were
silenced by threats of violence and acts of vandalism perpetrated by members
of the secessionist majority, or in the case of the German-language press. were
confined by the language with which they expressed their disconteneu
The second trend, which is closely related to the first, is that Texas press
coverage remained distinctly sanguine even in the wake of disaster. This can
be explained in part by the fact that the Union controlled the Mississippi River,
and as a result Texas was increasingly cut off from the war-torn eastern section
of the nation. Aside from ephemeral coastal warfare and minor campaigning
in the Red River and Rio Grande valleys, Texas enjoyed relative isolation. The
absence of contestlng armies, wartime emancipation of slaves by roving
Yankee units, and other exigencies felt east of the Mississippi River allowed
for the perpetuation of antebellum norms in the Lone Star State that helped
contribute to the press's optimistic outlook.
The third trend was a marked tendency toward equivocation. The press's
presentation of events at any given point in time was not a static construct;
rather, the press demonstrated a proclivity to change its position based on the
current military situation or the political climate. Although Texas editors
genuinely believed their news to be accurate, it was more important to sustain
public spirit. When continuity clashed with the need to strengthen public
morale, morale wall out This trend can be best demonstrated in the press'
treatment of the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston or the henefit to the
Confederacy of the Lincoln-Johnson ticket. In the case of Johnston's
generalship, the press originally heralded him as the champion of the southern
cause, but once he was removed by the Davis administration, it became
manifest to the press that he was only a champion of misguided tactics.
Additionally in the case of the acceptability of Lincoln's reelection,
throughout the summer the prospect of his reelection was viewed as abhorrent
to everything for which Texans were fighting. but once McClellan disavowed
a peace acceptable to the South, Lincoln was viewed as the preferable
presidential candidate.
In the context of the greater Confederate newspaper culture, the Texas
press was unique, Scholarly consensus, which has invariably looked at the
Eastern press, proffers that public morale was low in the autumn of 1864. An
analysis of Texas press opinion demonstrates that in the case of Texas, morale
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did not deteriorate after the twin debacles of the fall of Atlanta or the reelection
of Lincoln. To the contrary, Texas news coverage demonstrated an acute ability
to minimize misfortune and augment auspicious successes for the net effect of
sustaining spirit. The Texas press offered its readership a generally optimistic
opinion of the state of Confederate affairs as late as the winter of 1865. Indeed,
as the Marshall Texas Republican observed, the autumn of 1864 was "the
brightest era the Confederacy [had] ever known."
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